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TRUSTS, FOR MASSES
From time to time various aspects of a trust for Masses
have been presented to the courts for interpretation. The
meaning of the word charity within or without the Statute
of Charitable Uses of 1601 (43 Eliz.) and the failure to un-
derstand the nature of the Mass have been the cause of
much of this litigation.
The Statute of Charitable Uses (43 Eliz.) restated the
scope of charitable uses but studiously avoided mentioning
religion as a charitable use. But under the principle of
contemporaneous construction the cases justify the conclu-
sion that uses for religious purposes were considered as
charitable uses within the equity of the statute.1 Thus, in
a case decided in 1639 where money was given to maintain
a preaching minister it was held to be a charitable use al-
though not specifically mentioned in the Statute of Chari-
table Uses of 1601.2
In England a'trust for Masses was originally held valid,
subsequently invalid, and again valid in 1919.1 Although
the Catholic Relief Acts of 1791 and 1829 and the Catholic
Charities Acts of 1823 and 1860 would have warranted the
courts of England in upholding a trust for Masses, it was
not until 1919 that such a trust was held valid and not void
as a superstitious use.4 In the United States the doctrine of
superstitious uses has never been recognized, but the valid-
ity of a trust for Masses has been questioned on other
grounds.
I It should be noted that the STATUTE OF CHARITABLE UsEs did mention that
the repair of churches was a charitable use. Cf. Scotch case of Baird's Trustees
v. Lord Advocate, 15 Sess. Cas. (4th ser.) 682.
2 Pember v. Inhabitants of Knighton, Duke 82 (1639) (ScoTT'S CASES ON
TRusTs, 2nd ed., 1931, p. 304).
3 Bourne v. Keane, A. C. 815, (1919) (This contains a summary of the law
in England on this question. Bequest of personal estate for Masses valid).
4 Ibid. In Ireland in O'Hanlon v. Logue, 1 Irish Rep. Ch. Div. 247 (1906)
it was held that a trust for Masses was a charitable trust.
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"Masses are religious ceremonials or observances...
and come within the religious or pious uses which are up-
held as public charities." ' This observation from a recent
New York decision has not always been recognized either
in New York or in some of the sister states.
Where a testator has manifested an intention to bequeath
property for Masses, the courts at different times have ar-
rived at the following varied results:
(1) A valid charitable trust
(2)- A valid private trust and not a charitable trust
(3) An invalid private trust
(4) A valid gift and not a trust
(5) Neither a valid gift nor a trust
(6) An attempted private trust that failed on account
of the absence of a living beneficiary
(7) An attempted charitable trust that failed because
Masses for the soul of the testator was not for
the common good or general welfare
(8) A private trust that failed because it violated the
rule of perpetuities
(9) Neither a charitable trust nor a private trust but
sustainable as "funeral expenses"
(10) An attempted trust that failed because it was for
a superstitious use
(11) A religious trust, but not a charitable trust and
void if made within a certain period before death.
An examination of some of the leading cases will be made
in order to ascertain the cause of such inconsistency and to
determine what the law is to-day.
In a well known case it is stated:
"Charity in its legal sense comprises four, principal divisions: trusts
for the relief of poverty; trusts for the advancement of education;
trusts for the advancement of religion; 6 and trusts for other purposes
5 In Re Smalman's Will, 247 N. Y. S. 593, at 602 (1931).
6 Italicised by the present writer. -
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beneficial to the community, not falling under any of the preceding
heads." 7
The nature of the Mass should be considered in reference
to its charitable category. This would prevent confusion
where the Masses are to be celebrated for the repose of the
soul of the testator, instead of for all poor souls.
At the outset, it should be kept in mind that the Mass
is essentially a public rite. In a commendable Wisconsin
case the following definition is stated:
"The Mass is the unbloody sacrifice of the cross and the object for
which it is offered up is in the first place, to honor and glorify God;
secondly, to thank Him for his favors; third, to ask His blessing;
fourth, to propitiate Him for the sins of all mankind. The individuals
who participate in the fruits of this Mass are the person or persons
for whom the Mass is offered, all of those who assist at the Mass,
the celebrant himself, and for all mankind, within or without the fold
of the church." 8
In the United States, there has been some difficulty caused
by the question whether the jurisdiction of Chancery over
charitable uses is to be determined by referring to the Stat-
ute of Charitable Uses of 1601 (43 Eliz.) or the inherent
power of a court of Chancery.9 In Spence's classical trea-
tise it is stated:
"Originally, where a gift for a charitable or pious purpose was made in
a will of personal estate, no doubt the ordinary, who, as before ob-
served, assumed a right to provide that a portion of every man's per-
sonal estate should be applied for pious or charitable uses, would see
to its execution, even though the gifts were indefinite and there were
no specific objects pointed out, as where the gift was for the poor or
the like; more especially as the Roman Law afforded ample prece-
dents for the establishment and regulation of such charitable trusts.
So where gifts of personal estate were made by act inter vivas, to
7 Commissioners for Special Purposes of Income Tax v. Pemsel, A. C. 531
at 583 (ScoTT'S CASES oN TRUSTS, 2nd ed., 1931, p. 302). See: Jackson v. Phillips,
14 Allen 539 (1867) for another definition of charity.
8 Will of Kavanaugh, 143 Wis. 90, 126 N. W. 672, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 470
(1910).
9 Trustees of the Baptist Church v. Hart's Executors, 4 Wheat. 1 (1819),
and Vidal v. Girard's Executors,- 2 How. 128 (1844). The latter case overruled
the former which relied on the STATUTE op CHARITABLE USES (43 ELiz.) 1601.
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persons capable of taking, for definite charitable purposes or uses;
and where lands, or the use of lands, were by deed or will directed to
be- applied for the like purposes, the Court of Chancery, apparently
under its general power to enforce the performance of trusts, enter-
tained jurisdiction of trusts of this description equally as of private
trusts." 10
In the Indiana case that follows some aspects of the
matters referred to in the previous chapters were discussed.
In this instance the testator provided that a specified amount
should be used for Masses for the repose of all poor souls."
The Rector of St. Mary's Catholic Church Of Greensburgh,
Indiana, and the parish councillors and their successors in
office were named as trustees. The will was contested on
the ground that there was not a living beneficiary having
capacity to enforce the trust. Another objection to the
validity of the request was that the* trustees named were
not representatives of an incorporated body capable of tak-
ing legal title to property. Since the trustees had been
individually named the court properly overruled the ob-
jection on that point. The court further concluded that
the absence of a living beneficiary was not fatal. As pre-
viously indicated, the beneficiaries in cases of this nature are
the living and the dead. It was pointed out that the court
could see that the trust was fulfilled due to the fact that the
trustees were subject to the control of the court. That is
a sound test. This case also brings out the importance of
the form of expression used by the testator. As a matter
of principle, the case should not turn on whether the Masses
were to be celebrated "for the repose of my soul" or "for
all poor souls." But note the following statement made by
the court in this case (referring to the Mass):
"It is common, public to all, as a religious ceremony, and is therefore
a religious or pious use, and is a public charity, as distinguished
10 SPENCE, THE EQUITABLE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY, Vol.
1, Book III, Chap. XI, p. 587, (1846). See: Fourfold Nature of Equity in un-
published manuscript of B. F. Brown, Cand. D. Phil. (Oxford, 1931).
11 Ackerman v. Fichter, 179 Ind. 392, 101 N. E. 493, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.)
221, (1913). Cf. Estate of Lennon, 152 Cal. 327, 92 Pac. 870 (1907).
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from a private charity, wkich it might be if restricted to masses for
the souls of designated persons." 12
If the testator had not used the expression "for all poor
souls" the aforesaid dictum 13 indicates the trust probably
would have been held non-charitable and invalid. It was
probably the failure to understand the nature of the Mass
that caused the court to make a statement that cannot be
accepted as a matter of principle. In other words, the pivot-
al point should not be rested -on the souls of the departed,
when all mankind is included.
In a leading Illinois case 11 a testator named the Holy
Family Church on West Twelfth Street in Chicago as trustee
of specific real estate for the purpose of selling the property
and expending the proceeds for Masses for the souls of the
testator, his deceased wife, his mother-in-law, and brother-
in-law. The will also provided that another $1,000.00 was
left in trust for Masses for the souls of the testator and his
father, mother, and brother. It was contended that the
trust was a private trust for the souls of particular individ-
uals and that it failed because it lacked living beneficiaries
capable of compelling the trustee to execute the trust. It
was also claimed that the Holy Family Church had no capac-
ity to act as trustee as it was an unincorporated associa-
tion and could not take the title to the property. The court
held that the trust was a valid charitable trust and although
the Holy Family Church was legally incapable of being
trustee, the court would appoint a trustee to take the gift
and apply it to the purposes of the trust. It was pointed
out that the Statute of Charitable Uses is a part of the
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid. In Todd v. Citizens' Gas Co. of Indianapolis, 46 F. (2nd) 855,
at 865 (1931), the court said: "The doctrine of charitable uses is a part ot the
law of Indiana."
14 Hoeffer v. Clogan, 171 Ill. 462, 49 N. E. 527, 40 L. R. A. 730 (1893).
See: Wittmeier v. Heiligenstein, 308 Ill. 434, 139 N. E. 871 (1923) (ScoTT's
CASES ON TRusTS, 2nd ed., p. 231) (where a deed to St. Clare's Roman Catholic
Church of Altamond was held void as the grantee was an unincorporated religious
society. It did not preclude a trust from arising under the facts.)
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common law of Illinois and that it was not a question of
whether the Mass was to be celebrated for all souls or in-
dividual souls, since the trust for Masses was a charitable
use within the statute. 15
In a Wisconsin case the trust for Masses provided that
the Masses should be celebrated for the souls of the testa-
tor's family.6 : As an earlier Wisconsin case 17 had held
that a somewhat similar trust was void as a private trust,
the lower court in the present case was influenced by that
erroneous interpretation. On appeal the Supreme Court
said:
"The main question in the case before us, therefore, is whether a be-
quest for masses is a charitable bequest, and this being determined
in the affirmative, we easily reach the conclusion that the trust is
valid." 18
In this instance if the dicta of the Indiana case 1. had been
recognized the decision would have been to the contrary.
The Wisconsin court 20 and the Illinois court 21 seem to be in
harmony on this question and hold that the ultimate test is
the manifest intention of the testator and that the classifi-
cation of a trust will not be changed from charitable to non-
charitable if the testator specifies Masses only for his own
soul.
Another aspect of this question was presented in a Cali-
fornia case where the testator left bequests to an Archbishop
for Masses and other bequests to pastors for Masses to be
celebrated by them.22 In this case the Masses were limited
15 Ibid. On the collateral point that there is not a living cestui que trust,
see: In Re Gibbon (1917) 1 I. R. 448, where the bequest was to be used "to my
best spiritual advantage, as conscience and sense of duty may direct."
16 Will of Kavanaugh, supra note 8.
17 McHugh v. McCole, 97 Wis. 166, 72 N. W. 631 (1897).
18 Will of Kavanaugh, supra note 8.
19 Ackerman v. Fichter, supra note 11.
20 Will of Kavanaugh, supra note 8.
21 Hoeffer v. Clogan, supra note. 14;
22 In re Hamilton's Estate, 181 Cal.. 758, 186 Pac. 587 (1919) (Cosm_-'s
CAsE;s oN TRusTs, p. 359).
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to the souls of relatives and to that extent this case was on
all fours with the previous Wisconsin case.2" Due to the
use of the expression "and I request that Masses be offered
for the repose of my soul" it was contended that a private
trust was involved and that it failed for the want of a living
beneficiary, and that the expression was precatory. After
upholding the trust for Masses as charitable where the
Archbishop was to have Masses celebrated, the court added:
"This is not true of the bequests to particular pastors for Masses in
their churches. As we have said, these bequests go personally to such
priests for them to use as they see fit, and there is no trust." 24
In other words, the court holds that there is a trust where the
trustee is to select others to celebrate the Mass, but there
is no trust where the trustee is to celebrate the Mass. This
line of demarcation is unsound in principle. Fundamentally
both instances indicate that the manifest intention of the
testator was to create a trust for Masses. The fact that
the particular pastors named as trustees were to say the
Masses did not change the inherent nature of the trust.
If a testator bequeaths $500 to his parish priest for Masses
to be said personally by him and also makes a bequest of
$500 to his parish priest for Masses to be said by another
priest to be selected by the parish priest, there would be a
trust for Masses in both cases. The fact that the trustee
is the celebrant in one case and not in the other is a col-
lateral matter that has no bearing on the validity of the
trust. Although in other respects the California case is
to be approved, as a matter of principle the unsoundness
of the above statement should not be overlooked.25
In an important Iowa case the testator directed the
executor to sell specific real estate and expend the proceeds
for Masses for the souls of the testator and his deceased
23 Will of Kavanaugh, supra note 8.
24 In re Hamilton's Estate, supra note 22. (Italicised by present writer). Ci.
ZOLLmAN, ANa cAc LAW OF CHAMErns, p. 568 (1924).
25 See statement supra note 24.
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wife.2 ' No particular parish or priest had been designated
in the will and a contest arose because of the uncertainty
and indefiniteness in the designation of a beneficiary.
Technicalities were brushed aside, and the manifest inten-
tion of the testator stressed in an opinion upholding the
validity of the bequest as a private trust. This interpreta-
tion is peculiar to Iowa. In the light of reason and the
facts, at the present day such a bequest is generally held
to be in the category of a charitable trust. The Iowa Code
and decisions compel the, bequest to be defined as a private
trust or fail. The court states:
"The doctrine of charitable or pious trusts as applied to bequests of
this character (for Masses) has not been adopted in this state.... "127
But the court realizes it might be misunderstood and says:
"Bequests for masses are generally sustained in this country (except
where same contravenes some provision of statute) under the doctrine
of charitable or pious trusts. .... ," 28
Legislation would seem to be the remedy for such a con-
dition. Besides being unsound in principle such a doctrine
often causes trouble on collateral issues that do not arise
where the orthodox view prevails.
In a Kentucky case the testator provided in his will that
Three Hundred Dollars should be expended for the celebra-
tion of Masses for the repose of his soul.29  It was con-
tended that such a provision was void because, "first, it is
not a charitable use within the meaning of our statute;
secondly, there is no trustee appointed to carry out the
bequest; and thirdly, since no beneficiary is designated, and
this is a private trust, it is invalid for the want of a bene-
ficiary to enforce it." o The objections were overruled
26 Wilmes v. Tiernay, 187 Iowa 390, 174 N. W. 271 (1919).
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid. (In an earlier case in Iowa the private trust doctrine was recognized
where'the bequest was, "to the Catholic priest, who may be pastor of Beaver
Catholic Church . . . . that masses may be said for me." See: Moran v. Moran,
104 Iowa 216, 73 N. W. 617 (1897).
29 Obrecht v. Pujos, 206 Ky. 751, 268 S. W. 564 (1925).
30 Ibid.
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and the validity of the bequest sustained on the ground
that a charitable use was involved and the rule of private
trusts was not applicable. The absence of a trustee was not
material as the court could remedy that situation by ap-
pointing one. The court said: "Both before and since
the enactment of the Statute of 43 Elizabeth, after which
our statute is modeled, it has been the rule that a gift for
religious purposes is one for a charitable purpose." 81 One
cannot fail to observe that the decision is outstanding for
its clearness.
A Canadian case exposes another angle of this question.
A bequest of the residue of the testator's estate to St. Basil's
Roman Catholic Church, "to be invested and kept invested
.... forever and the interest . . . . to be applied and ex-
pended . . . . for saying of Holy Masses . . . for the
repose of the soul of the testator and his descendents for-
ever," was held invalid as creating or tending to create a
perpetuity and not a charitable use.32 This case illustrates
the importance of placing the fact pattern in its proper
mould. The manifest intention of the testator would not
have been violated if the court had considered this as in-
volving a charitable trust because the perpetuity would
not have been applicable.3
A trust for Masses has been held invalid in India on the
grounds of public policy. 4 In a recent case in India in-
31 Ibid. (In Strother v. Barrow, 246 Mo. 241, 151 S. W. 960 (1912) it is
stated: "From ancient times a pious use has been considered a charitable use.
The quoted statute speaks of both, but in a broad sense the one includes the
other. The principles of law governing one govern the other." The court referring
to the English STAT UE or CuArTABLE Usxs says: "That act is part of our com-
mon law, but it has been held that its enumeration of charities.is not preclusive.")
32 Re Zeagman, 37 Ontario L. R. 536 (1916). Cf. Elmsley v. Madden, 18
Grant 386 (1871). See 36 L. Q. REv. 152.
33 On an aspect of perpetuity see: Reichenbach v. Quin, 21 L. R. Ir. 138
(1888), ScoTr's CASES oN TRUSTS, 2nd ed., p. 282. But note that O'Hanlon v.
Logue, (1906) 1 Irish R. 247, overcomes the previous objection by its holding
that the trust for Masses is charitable.
34 Colgom v. Administrator General, Madras, 1 L. R. 15 Mad. 424-446
(1892), cited in BOm.BAY LAW JOuRNAL, May 1929, p. 582.
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volving perpetual death ceremonies or Dharam Kriya it
was held that the bequest was valid and not void for un-
certainty.35 "Previously dharam had been held void for
vagueness. If the court has changed its view on the valid-
ity of Dharam Kriya it is bound, if it is going to be con-
sistent, to uphold the 'validity of a trust for Masses since
the principle of religious uses would apply to Masses in
India if it does to Dharam Kriya. Since the decision of
Bourne v. Keane 31 in England in 1919 upheld a bequest
for Masses as not being void as a superstitious use, the
holdings in courts influenced indirectly by the English law
will no doubt be affected by it. Cessante ratione legis, ces-
sat ipsa lex.3 7
In one instance an individual thought that a trust for
Masses was a sum of money that had been bequeathed to
charity for the masses of the people. In a sense this is cor-
rect, because the trust for Masses is for the moral and
spiritual benefit of all mankind. The universality of the
Mass and its benefits is iniportant in ascertaining the true
significance of such a trust in the eyes of the law. The
Mass is-not as some courts think for the benefit exclusively
of a single'soul, even though it is celebrated by virtue of
a former request of a deceased individual.
35 Abdul Sakiur v. Abu Baker, suit No. 1431 (1928), discussed in BOMBAY
LAW JOURNAL, May 1929, pp. 582-587.
86 Bourne v. Keane, supra note 3. In an English case one hundred years ago
-Heath v. Chapman, 2 Drew. 417-a trust for Masses for the souls of the POOR
'dead was held not to be a charitable trust.
37 See: Yeap Cheah Neo v. Ong Cheng Neo, L. R. 6 P. C. 381 (1875)
(Chinese religious ceremonies held not charitable).
No cases were found in which the unusual practice in the orthodox Jewish
religion of a member of the Synagogue bequeathing money to the Synagogue for
yearly services. As a rule this only occurs where there are no children or where the
unorthodox belief of the children causes the 'father to think the children might
neglect the services after his death. In some instances the money is sent to Pales-
tine. (Prayers are said for deliverance after death.)
In re Michel's Trust, 28 Beav. 39, 54 Eng. Rep. 280 (1-860): "A bequest by a
Jew who died in 1821 of 10 pounds per annum to be paid to three persons to
learn, in their Beth Hammadrass, or college, two hours daily, and on every anni-
versary of the testator's death to say the prayer called in Hebrew 'Candish,' and
which is a short Hebrew prayer in the praise of God and expressive of resignation
to His will, is valid."
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The factual situation in these cases has not been given
a consistent meaning that lawyers can interpret and uni-
formly accept. Although there are many sound conclu-
sions it is likewise true that other generalities fail to fit
the pattern of particular cases. In this period of investi-
gation and restatement of values, the legalist will find this
a fertile field for focusing forces.
It has been suggested that the medical profession use
symbols to identify specific cases. If that idea could be
used to advantage in the law for identifying legal cases,
the following symbols might apply to the matter being dis-
cussed: S-M-T-C-
S represents the deceased who bequeathed money for
Masses (Settlor)
M represents Masses requested to be celebrated
T represents the person who is to expend the money for
Masses (Trustee)
C indicates the cestui que trust---charity.
In every case of this nature the symbols S - M - T - C -
are constant and the conclusion is always the same. Though
collateral issues might vary in every case because of the
recalcitrancy of facts, the constant symbols S - M - T - C -
if present, would indicate that the case related to a chari-
table trust. The symbols constitute a framework in a sense.
Additional accidental details do not change its essence any
more than additional garments change an individual.
An examination of the cases indicites that a trust for
Masses does not have a uniform legal significance. This
is especially true of the cases decided in the 19th Century
in the United States, Canada, England, and Ireland. With-
in the last thirty years, however, there has been a trend
towards a settled rule upholding the validity of a trust for
Masses. In the United States to-day, nevertheless, there
are three general classifications: charitable trust, private
trust, and an outright gift, though the charitable trust cate-
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gory is the only one sound in principle. This inconsistency
seems to be primarily caused by a failure to realize" the true
significance of the Mass, viz., that it is not primarily in-
dividualistic, but is essentially a public rite for the benefit
of all mankind. It seems to be difficult to point out to some
courts that the money to be expended for the celebration of
Masses is always held in trust. This rule applies to trustees
who are to expend ' the fund for Masses whether they are
going to celebrate the Mass or have it celebrated. In other
words whether the bequest is to a layman to select a priest,
or direct to the pastor, the money is nevertheless held in
trust. If the fund would be used for other purposes a
breach of trust would result. For this reason a trust and
not an absolute gift is always involved. The weight of
authority- supports the trust theory and holds that a chari-
table trust results in these cases. A weak minority hold a
private trust results. A still weaker minority hold that an
absolute gift is involved.
Since 1900 there have been decisions upholding a be-
quest for Masses as a charitable trust in Ireland in 1906;38
New Zealand in 1910 " and Australia in 1917.40 In 1919
England upheld the validity of such a bequest and over-
ruled a line of earlier decisions which consistently held the
bequest void as a superstitious use." Practically all de-
cisions in the United States within the last twenty years
have been in favor of the validity of the bequest but not
on the same grounds, that is, usually as a charitable trust
but occasionally as non-charitable. In a Canadian case in
1916 the court followed an unorthodox rule and held the
bequest invalid.4" In spite of the fact that there is not a
38 O'Hanlon v. Logue, 1 Irish- Re. Ch. Div. (1906) 247.
39 Carrigan v. Redwood, 30 N. Z. L. R. 244 (1910).
40 Nelan v. Downes, 23 C. L. R. 546.
41 Bourne v. Keane, supra note 3. GoDEFRox ON TRUSTS, 5th ed. (1927), p.
186 states that such bequests ought to have been held valid since 1829.
42 Re Zeagman, supra note 32.
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uniform rule on this subjeci today, it appears that the law.
is progressing towards the true, doctrine. Proof of this
trend is indicated by the overwhelming weight of authority




De Paul University, College of Law.
The following sources present various aspects of the be-
quest for Masses. A few of the cases and treatises and ar-
ticles on the subject for ready reference have been included.
DECISIONS
ALABAMA: Festorazzi v. St. Joseph's Catholic Church, 104
Ala. 327, 18 So. 394, 25 L. R. A. 360 (1894). (A bequest
for Masses was held not to be within the charitable or
private trust categories.)
CALrFORNIA: In re Lennon's Estate, 152 Cal. 327, 92 Pac.
870, 125 Am. St. Rep. 58, 14 Ann. Cas. 1024 (1907); In
re Hamilton's Estate, 181 Cal. 758, 186 Pac. 587 (1919).
IowA: Moran v. Moran, 104 Ia. 216, 73 N. W. 617, 39
L. R. A. 204, 65 Am. St. Rep. 443 (1897); Wilmes v.
Tiernay, 187 Ia. 390, 174 N. W. 271 (1919).
ILLINOIS: Kehoe v. Kehoe, Cook Co. C. C. (Ill.) 22 A.
L. R. m. s. 656 (1871); Hoeffer v. Clogan, 171 Ill. 462,
49 N. E. 527, 40 L. R. A. 730, 63 Am. St. Rep. 241
(1898); Gilmore v. Lee, 237 Ill. 402, 86 N. E. 568, 127
43 In O'Hanlon v. Logue, supra note 38, Pallas, C. B. Said: The Court "must
ascertain the spiritual efficacy according to the doctrines of the religion in question:
and if, according to those doctrines, that divine service does result in public benefit,
either temporal or spiritual, the act must in law, be deemed charitable."
(It was not within the purview of this article to consider restriction on charit-
able gifts, that is as to the time the instrument must be executed before death, the
amount that may be given and the amount that a charity may receive. The
writer will be pleased to receive any suggestions for the purpose of considering
chem in reference to another article on other aspects of this subject now being
prepared).
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Am. St. Rep. 330 (1908); Burke v. Burke, 259 Ill. 262,
102 N. E. 293 (1913).
INDIANA: Ackerman v. Fichter, 179 Ind. 392, 101 N. E.
493, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 221, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 1117
(1913).
KANSAS: Harrison v. Brophy, 59 Kan. 1, 51 P. 883, 40
L. R. A. 721 (1898).
KENTUCKY: Coleman v. O'Leary's Ex'rs, 114 Ky. 388, 70
S. W. 1068, 24 Ky. Law Rep. 1248 (1902); Obrecht v.
Pujos, 206 Ky. 751, 268 S. W. 564 (1925).
MASSACHUSETTS: Ex parte Schouler, 134 Mass. 426
(1883).
MINNESOTA: In re Shanahan's Estate, 88 Minn. 202, 92
N. W. 948 (1903).
MIssouRi: Schmucker v. Reel, 61 Mo. 592 "(1876);
Strother v. Barrows, 246 Mo. 241, 151 S. W. 960 (1912).
NEw HAMPSHIRE: Webster v. Sughrow, 69 N. H. 380, 45
Atl. 139, 48 L. R. A. 100 (1898).
NEw JERSEY: Moran v. Kelley, -95 N. J. Eq. 380, Aff'd
96 N. J. Eq. 699, 126 Atl. 924 (1924); Chelsea Nat.
Bank v. Our Lady Star of the Sea, Atlantic City, N. J.,
105 N. J. Eq. 236, 147 Atl. 470 (1929).
NEw YORK: Gilman v. McArdle, 99 N. Y. 451, 2 N. E.
464 (1885); Holland v. Alcock, 108 N. Y. 312, 16 N. E.
305 (1888); In re Welch, 105 Misc. 27, 172 N. Y. S. 349
(i918); Morris v. Edwards, 227 N. Y. 141, 124 N. E.
724 (1919); In re Beck's Estate, 130 Misc. 765, 225
N. Y. S. 187 (1927); In re Brown's Will, 135 Misc.' 611,
238 N. Y. S. 160 (1930); In re Werrick's Estate, 135
Misc. 876, 239 N. Y. S. 740 (1930).
PENNSYLVANIA: Appeal of Rhymer, 93 Pa. 142, 39 Am.
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